Suchergebnisse

Colonial legacy and the post-independence period -- Political regimes and democratic stability -- Guerrillas and revolutions -- US-Latin American relations -- Latin American presidentialism -- Legislatures in Latin America -- Elections and electoral rules -- The judiciary -- Political culture -- Corruption -- Civil liberties and press freedom -- Income inequality, poverty, and the gender gap.

AbstractThis paper focuses on congressional politics in Chile before and after the 1973 coup. It challenges a common perspective that sees the congressional decay of the early 1970s as being caused by stringent limits on particularistic bills and by presidents with wide-ranging formal prerogatives. It presents an alternative argument that focuses on electoral competition and ideological radicalisation, derives testable implications, and provides the first empirical comparison of legislative behaviour before and after the 1973 coup. The evidence, which centres on the analysis of policy networks derived from the joint sponsorship of legislation, appears incompatible with the implications of the conventional argument.

Abstract
Legislators who control the congressional agenda have a significant advantage over the membership at large. Policy gatekeepers can restrict change to outcomes they prefer over the status quo and can use this prerogative to keep a legislative party or coalition unified. This article examines agenda-setting rules in 26 Latin American chambers, shows why the institutional structure is theoretically relevant, and reveals some implications for policymaking with evidence from Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Majority leaders in the Argentine and Chilean lower chambers have successfully blocked passage of legislation opposed by most of their fellow partisans despite the lack of codified gatekeeping rights. Since 1997, none of the major Mexican parties has benefited from the gatekeeping rights established in the rules. Instead, the benefits have come from the parties' advantageous position with respect to the other parties on the steering committee setting the plenary agenda.

The transition of the Peruvian political system to decentralization has uncovered a number of factors that condition national development although by bringing the State closer to the people, the contrary should be expected. These elements underlie the existing culture of government and the ordinary citizen's so that despite specifi c opportunities to foster development, they are not revealed in human development indicators but only on economic indicators. One of these elements is the natural reaction to changes in the power structure existing inside the centralist system that have been revealed by the slow transfer of competencies from the central to the sub-national governments. Another such element is the limited ability of sub-national governments that fail to respond to the challenge of demonstrating better competencies to address the citizens' demands. ; El tránsito del sistema político peruano hacia la descentralización descubre un conjunto de elementos que condicionan el desarrollo nacional, a pesar de que se esperaría lo contrario ante un proceso que aproxima el Estado al ciudadano. Estos elementos subyacen en la cultura del gobernante y el poblador común, de modo que, pese a la coyuntura que ofrece oportunidades propicias para el desarrollo, este no se expresa en indicadores de desarrollo humano, solo en indicadores económicos. Uno de estos elementos es la reacción natural que surge cuando se trastocan las estructuras de poder formadas en el anterior régimen centralista, lo que el lento proceso de transferencia de competencias del gobierno nacional a los gobiernos subnacionales pone en evidencia. Otro de estos elementos es la limitada capacidad de los gobernantes subnacionales, quienes no alcanzan a responder el reto de demostrar mejores competencias para atender las demandas ciudadanas.